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A B S T R A C T
Both ancillary and primary beneﬁts, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to
implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new
IEA model with ancillary beneﬁts, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost
functions of each country. This study also investigates the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on the condition for full
participation in IEA. Ancillary beneﬁts function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our
main results show that ancillary beneﬁts can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should
be considered in climate change negotiations.
1. Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) provide public goods
such as the mitigation of climate change. The eﬀectiveness of an IEA
depends on the number of participating countries and the levels of public
goods provisions. A new basic framework aimed at the prevention of global
warming was compiled during the twenty-ﬁrst session of the United
Nations Conference of Parties (COP21), held in Paris, France, in 2015.
Its scope was to uphold and promote regional and international coopera-
tion to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action by all parties
and non-party stakeholders.1 However, each country’s greenhouse gases
(GHGs) emissions cause environmental damage all over the world, and a
single country’s public goods provision will beneﬁt all countries in a non-
exclusive and non-rival manner. Hence, all countries have an incentive to
free ride on other countries' abatement eﬀorts.
Previous research suggests that there are two types of international
environmental public goods provision: the provision of pure public
goods; and the provision of impure public goods (e.g., Aunan et al.,
2007; Ekins, 1996a, 1996b; Finus and Rübbelke, 2013; Rive, 2010).
The pure type has only public characteristics: climate change mitiga-
tion generates global scale public beneﬁts that all countries equally
receive by mitigation of climate change (primary beneﬁts). The impure
type has public and private characteristics: climate protection gener-
ates not only primary beneﬁts, but also private beneﬁts that only
abating countries receive by individual climate protection (ancillary
beneﬁts). Whereas the primary beneﬁts can be enjoyed globally, the
ancillary beneﬁts can only be enjoyed on a local scale. For example,
climate protection behaviors reduce not only GHGs emissions but also
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter
(PM) emissions simultaneously.2 Therefore, if a provision of public
goods has private and public characteristics, it may aﬀect the will-
ingness of countries to participate in IEAs.
A considerable number of literatures have addressed the provision
of global international pollution controls. Models of cooperation for
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climate control can be roughly divided into two groups: a participation
game model where compliance is assumed; and repeated game model
where compliance is ensured by the threat of future decreased
abatement by punishing countries. The participation game model
depicts the formation of agreements as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage, countries decide whether or not to sign an IEA. In the second
stage, the signatories jointly choose the abatement levels, while each
non-signatory independently chooses it abatement levels (e.g., Barrett,
1994, 2001; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus and Rübbelke, 2013;
van der Pol et al., 2012).3 In the participation game model, no
signatory deviates because we assume that all signatories abate in
accordance with the agreement. Early studies of the participation game
by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) demonstrate that
the stable agreement is generally small. In summary, these studies
demonstrate how diﬃcult it is to forge an agreement with eﬀective
abatement levels and full participation under the participation game
framework.
In a repeated game model, the game is inﬁnitely repeated and we
assume that the participation countries in the IEA are forced to
cooperate at subsequent stages through credible threats (e.g., Asheim
et al., 2006; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009; Barrett, 1999, 2002, 2003;
Froyn and Hovi, 2008).4 The punishment is credible if the threats
prevent the punishing countries from renegotiating and returning to
cooperative behavior after a unilateral deviation. That is, the compli-
ance is ensured by the threat of credible punishment in a repeated
game model.
In this game model, agreements must specify a strategy that can
enforce the signatories’ cooperation. It must be the best interest for
each country to individually act in accordance with the strategy (i.e.,
the subgame perfection requirement). Additionally, renegotiation must
be prevented in such an equilibrium agreement (i.e., the renegotiation-
proofness requirement). In particular, it must be in the best interest of
the punishing countries to collectively punish a non-complying country
before restarting the cooperative relationship. If these requirements are
satisﬁed, the IEA can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibrium (in the sense of Farrell and Maskin, 1989).
Barrett (2002) demonstrates that a full participation agreement can
be sustained, by limiting the per-country level (a consensus treaty).
Asheim et al. (2006) present the Regional Penance strategy, which
limits the number of punishing countries by only letting a deviation be
punished by the other signatories in the same region, whereas
signatories in the other region continue to cooperate. The results of
Asheim et al. (2006) show that participation can be doubled in a two-
region world. Froyn and Hovi (2008) propose a Penance-m strategy
that speciﬁes that only a subset of the signatories in a global agreement
punish a deviator. The results of Froyn and Hovi (2008) show that a full
participation agreement can be implemented as a weakly renegotia-
tion-proof equilibrium within the linear abatement beneﬁt and cost
functions. Moreover, Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) show that full
participation is possible using Penance-m within linear beneﬁt and
quadratic cost functions.
In the climate change context, it has been argued that preventing
global warming generates not only primary beneﬁts which all countries
receive equally, but also ancillary beneﬁts that the individual climate
protecting countries receive privately. The ancillary beneﬁts have
attracted much attention in the context of emission abatement for
climate change. In reality, the combustion of fossil fuels emits a range
of secondary pollutants such as SO2, NOx, and PM. When each country
reduces their use of fossil fuels with the objective of abating GHGs,
these secondary pollutants are reduced simultaneously (Ekins, 1996a,
1996b; Aunan et al., 2007). Ekins (1996a, 1996b) shows that the
consideration of ancillary beneﬁts has a facilitating role for countries
engaging in climate policy. Furthermore, Aunan et al. (2007) show the
signiﬁcance of ancillary beneﬁts to China, that is, climate protection
will reduce GHGs and local pollutants such as particles and NOx.
Therefore, abatement tends to resolve regional environmental pro-
blems such as those associated with domestic air pollution as well as
global warming. Rive (2010) shows that considering the ancillary
beneﬁts of reducing SO2, NOx, and PM when designing policies
increases the attainability of the abatement goals and the political
feasibility of climate policies. Finus and Rübbelke (2013) investigate
the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on IEA participation. They take the
pessimistic view that an agreement can be sustained if entered into by a
few countries, and that the ancillary beneﬁts have a neutral or negative
impact on the number of signatories in a participation game frame-
work.5
Although there has been signiﬁcant analysis regarding the impact of
ancillary beneﬁts on international environmental policies and coopera-
tion for mitigating climate change, there has been limited analysis of
the strategic implications with respect to the cooperation of all
countries. This paper investigates the eﬀects of ancillary beneﬁts of
emission abatements on stable IEAs with full participation in a
repeated game model, using the Penance-m strategy of Froyn and
Hovi (2008). We consider two types of payoﬀ functions: linear beneﬁt
and cost functions; and linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost functions. An
important focus of this study is the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on the
conditions leading to the formation of full participation IEAs.
Our main contributions are as follows. Using the two types of payoﬀ
functions, we show that full participation is still feasible even if we
consider ancillary beneﬁts. That is, this study generalizes the full
participation weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria of Froyn and Hovi
(2008) and Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) to the case of ancillary
beneﬁts, where abatement costs functions are linear and quadratic,
respectively. Additionally, the results of this study are diﬀerent from
the results of Finus and Rübbelke (2013) and Froyn and Hovi (2008)
because we consider a diﬀerent situation. The negative eﬀect of
ancillary beneﬁts on a stable IEA shown by Finus and Rübbelke
(2013) disappears, if we consider a diﬀerent situation where compli-
ance is ensured by credible punishment threats. Compared to Froyn
and Hovi (2008), the number of punishing countries decreases because
of the ancillary beneﬁts with linear costs, whereas this number remains
unchanged with convex costs, if we consider a diﬀerent situation where
ancillary beneﬁts are introduced.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents a brief review of the Penance-m strategy. Section 3 describes
our models and the weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium outcomes.
Section 4 compares the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on the condition of
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium for the two cases. Finally,
Section 5 provides our concluding remarks and presents future scope
for research.
2. The Penance-m concept
We assume that the cooperative relationship in the agreement is
sustained by the Penance-m strategy of Froyn and Hovi (2008), which
limits the number of countries that can punish a deviator, and show the
feasibility of a weakly renegotiation-proof agreement with full partici-
pation and eﬃcient abatement levels. Consider a world with n≥2
countries, where N n={1,⋯, } denotes the set of all countries, and the
grand coalition where all n countries participate. Each country decides3 To prevent climate change, the two (or more)-stage game is used not only in
international policies such as IEAs but also in domestic environmental policies. For
example, see Ouchida and Goto (2014, 2016).
4 Hovi et al. (2015) categorize Asheim et al. (2006), Asheim and Holtsmark (2009),
Barrett (1999, 2002, 2003), and Froyn and Hovi (2008) as the studies that demonstrate
the IEAs formation within the repeated game framework.
5 Finus and Rübbelke (2013) explain that countries that consider the private ancillary
beneﬁts to a greater extent will abate more emissions, irrespective of the IEAs. Hence, the
relative importance of an IEA for climate protection is reduced.
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whether to observe the commitment to undertake an emission abate-
ment. That is, each country chooses to cooperate (i.e., accept abate-
ment levels that maximize the coalition payoﬀ) or to defect (i.e., accept
abatement levels that maximize each country’s individual payoﬀ).
Based on Froyn and Hovi (2008), we specify Penance-m as follows.6
(i) Any signatory plays cooperate unless another signatory has been
the sole deviator from Penance-m in the previous period.
(ii) If a unilateral deviation occurs, m countries are selected from the
signatories, excluding the deviator, and they play defect
( m n1 ≤ ≤ − 1). The n m− other countries play cooperate.
The main feature of Penance-m is to select m punishing countries.
The m punishing countries abandon their abatement action as punish-
ment. If a unilateral deviation occurs from Penance-m in period t by
playing defect, m countries are selected from the signatories (excluding
the deviator), and they play defect, as punishment, in period t+1.
The strategy must satisfy two requirements for IEAs to be weakly
renegotiation-proof. The ﬁrst requirement is that the strategy proﬁle
must be a subgame perfect equilibrium, meaning that a player cannot
increase its payoﬀ by selecting other behaviors. In a repeated game
with discounting, this requires that no player can gain by a one-period
deviation after any history.7 The second requirement is that the
strategy proﬁle must be renegotiation-proof. This requirement is
fulﬁlled if not all players strictly gain by collectively restarting
cooperation at the same time, instead of carrying out the threatened
punishment when a deviation has occurred in the previous period.
Punishment in Penance-m implies that m countries but the deviator
play defect after the deviation. This has a negative eﬀect on the deviator
and all non-punishing countries because of the m countries’ punishing
behavior. Renegotiation-proofness thus requires that the punishing
countries are at least as well oﬀ with punishment as with renegotiation.
3. Models and equilibrium outcomes
This section presents the models and their equilibrium outcomes.
Regarding the public beneﬁts from emission abatement, several IEA
studies consider that the beneﬁts of countries selecting an abatement
action are greater than or equal to the beneﬁts when they select free
riding (e.g., Asheim et al., 2006; Barrett, 1994, 1999; Froyn and Hovi,
2008).8 However, these studies do not provide deﬁnitive reasons for
this diﬀerence. If an abatement action also has private good character-
istics, the beneﬁts may diﬀer. Speciﬁcally, a private beneﬁt is a spillover
eﬀect that accompanies pollution mitigation. This paper assumes that
this diﬀerence occurs because cooperating countries receive some
additional beneﬁts. One example is the improvement of a domestic
environmental problem that occurs by reducing GHGs, such as the
reduction of air pollution or an improvement in biodiversity.9
Therefore, we adopt the concept that ancillary beneﬁts have the
characteristics of private beneﬁts, as per Finus and Rübbelke (2013).
Consider a world with n (≥2) identical countries. Let α≥0 denote the
parameter corresponding to ancillary beneﬁts. The total beneﬁt of
country i consists of public beneﬁts, private beneﬁts, and private costs.
The payoﬀ to country i is
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟∑π B q αB q C q i n= + ( )− ( ) for =1,⋯, ,i
j
n
j i i
=1 (1)
where qi is abatement level of country i,
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟B q∑ j
n
j=1 is the public good
part of the beneﬁts and depends on the total abatement, q∑ j
n
j=1 ; the
private good part of the beneﬁts, αB q( )i , and the cost function, C q( )i ,
depends on the individual abatement, qi.10 The public good part of the
beneﬁts denotes the reduction of GHGs, which is derived from the
abatement behaviors of participating countries, whereas the private
good part of the beneﬁts denotes the ancillary beneﬁts with abatement,
such as an improvement in domestic air pollution. We assume that an
abatement cost is higher than an abatement beneﬁt in the case of solo
abatement. If not, every country abates individually irrespective of the
agreement. In this paper, each country discounts its future payoﬀs
using a common discount factor, δ ( δ0 < < 1), which is close to 1.11
Subsequently, we consider the following two types of payoﬀ
functions that have been frequently used in the literature:
Case I: Linear beneﬁt and cost functions; and
Case II: Linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost functions.
Subsection 3.1 presents the model and equilibrium outcome of Case
I, and Subsection 3.2 presents the model and equilibrium outcome of
Case II.
3.1. Case I: Linear beneﬁt and cost functions
3.1.1. The model for Case I
We consider a model with linear beneﬁt and cost functions
corresponding to emission abatement, which is prominent in recent
literature (e.g., Asheim et al., 2006; Barrett, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003;
Froyn and Hovi, 2008). From Eq. (1), the payoﬀ function of country i
when the beneﬁt and cost functions are linear is
∑π b q αbq cq i n= + − for =1,⋯, ,i j
n
j i i=1 (2)
where b is the marginal beneﬁt from abatement, α denotes the
parameter corresponding to ancillary beneﬁts, and cqi represents the
total abatement costs of country i.
We assume that bn c b> > >0, and the strategy space for country i
is normalized to the decision variable q∈[0,1]i . The cooperative country
i selects q =1i as an optimal solution that maximizes coalition payoﬀs. If
country i deviates, it selects q =0i as the optimal solution that maximizes
its individual payoﬀ because the beneﬁt and cost functions are linear. If
the country plays cooperate, it chooses abatement level q =1c . If it plays
defect, it chooses abatement level q =0.u Therefore, the payoﬀ of i when
all countries abate is bn αb c+ − . If country i deviates, the payoﬀ of
country i is b n( − 1). Similar to Asheim et al. (2006) and Froyn and
Hovi (2008), we assume that n b bn αb c( −1) > + − >0, which means
that the full participation state Pareto dominates the no participation
state. Therefore, we have b αb c+ − <0, which means that no country
can gain their payoﬀs by a solo abatement.12
3.1.2. Equilibrium outcome of Case I
We examine the conditions of a weakly renegotiation-proof equili-
brium under which Penance-m satisﬁes the subgame perfection and
6 Froyn and Hovi (2008) use Penance-m with k m k n(1 ≤ < ≤ ) signatories. However,
we consider full participation similar to Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) and exclude the
behavior of non-signatories.
7 We know from the theory of repeated games with discounting that if a player cannot
gain by some one-period deviation, then he cannot gain by a multi-period deviation
(Abreu, 1988).
8 Asheim and Holtsmark (2009), Barrett (2001, 2002), McGinty (2010), and Osmani
and Tol (2010) consider the case where the beneﬁts of countries selecting an abatement
action are equal to the beneﬁts when they select a free ride.
9 For other examples, see Aunan et al. (2007) and Finus and Rübbelke (2013).
10 The expression of “public good part” and “private good part” is used in the study of
Finus and Rübbelke (2013).
11 This setting indicates the implicit assumption of the folk theory in the repeated
game framework. For more details, see Farrell and Maskin (1989).
12 The assumption b αb c+ − <0 means that every country cannot gain their payoﬀs
by a solo abatement because it will abate unilaterally irrespective of an IEA if this
assumption is not sustained. We implicitly assume that the countries must cooperate
internationally to reduce pollutants.
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renegotiation-proofness requirements. Lemma 1 deﬁnes the required
conditions for the subgame perfection requirement, and Lemma 2
deﬁnes the required conditions for the renegotiation-proofness re-
quirement.13
Lemma 1. The subgame perfection requirement holds if there exists
m such that
m c b α> / − − 1.
(Proof ). See Appendix A. □
The right hand side of the above inequality denotes the lower bound
of the number of punishing countries, which decreases with an increase
in α. The rationale behind this result is that each country’s incentive for
cooperation increases if they consider ancillary beneﬁts, that is, the
incentive for deviation decreases. Therefore, deviation is deterred even
if the number of punishing countries decreases.
Lemma 2. The renegotiation-proofness requirement holds if there
exists m such that
m c b α≤ / − .
(Proof). See Appendix B. □
The right hand side of the above inequality denotes the higher
bound of the number of punishing countries and decreases with
increasing α. The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. For
punishing countries, the incentive to cooperate increases with ancillary
beneﬁts, that is, the incentive to renegotiate also increases. Hence, we
need to increase the punishing countries’ payoﬀs by decreasing the
number of punishing countries, because their abatement increases the
number of countries that play to cooperate during the punishment
phase.
Proposition 1 below is directly obtained from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. There exists a weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium
if the number of punishing countries (m) is
c b α m c b α/ − −1< ≤ / − .
Two implications can be derived from this proposition. First, the
number of punishing countries decreases with increasing ancillary
beneﬁts. The number of punishing countries in our result is less than
that of Froyn and Hovi’s (2008) study because of the ancillary beneﬁts,
although our model also achieves a full participation agreement. That
is, the ancillary beneﬁts do not aﬀect the number of participating
countries but do aﬀect the number of punishing countries.
Second, in this paper, we simplify the diﬀerent beneﬁt eﬀects of
cooperate and defect obtained based on previous studies. Froyn and
Hovi (2008) consider that the slope of the beneﬁt function of a country
playing cooperate is steeper than or equal to the slope of the beneﬁt
function of the country playing defect. If these beneﬁt slopes are
calculated, m becomes less than that stated in Froyn and Hovi’s (2008)
study.14 The diﬀerence between these beneﬁt parameters has a similar
eﬀect to α, because the number of punishing countries decreases with
an increase in α. Essentially, a larger payoﬀ diﬀerence between
cooperation and deviation corresponds to a smaller stipulated number
of punishing countries. The eﬀect of the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ
between cooperate and defect is simply expressed as parameter α.
3.2. Case II: Linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost functions
3.2.1. The model for Case II
The payoﬀ function with linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost has been
considered in several studies (e.g., Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009; Finus
and Rübbelke, 2013; Osmani and Tol, 2010). In this case, it is generally
assumed that the marginal cost of pollution control increases with
higher environmental quality and treatment activities. For instance,
marginal costs increase because subsequent improvements in quality
gradually require more investment in technology. Therefore, the cost
function is quadratic, because we presume that the marginal costs of
abatement are increasing. We examine the range of the punishing
countries.
From Eq. (1), the payoﬀ function of country i when the beneﬁt
function is linear and the cost function is quadratic is
∑π b q αbq cq i n= + − /2 for =1,⋯, ,i j
n
j i i=1
2
(3)
where the ancillary beneﬁt is expressed as αbqi when the abatement
levels that country i chooses are non-negative real numbers, q∈[0,1]i .
Following Finus and Rübbelke (2013), we assume an interior solution
to solve the country’s optimization problem. We assume
nb αb c+ − /2 < 0, meaning the situation where all countries take
abatement q =1i is not proﬁtable for any country. The intuition behind
this assumption is that the marginal cost of pollution control increases
with higher environmental quality when using the quadratic cost
function.
Diﬀerentiating πi with respect to qi, and from the assumption of an
interior solution, the ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing the indivi-
dual country’s payoﬀ is
π q b αb cq∂ /∂ = + − =0.i i i
From the above equation, the optimal abatement level qu when each
country plays defect is
q α b c=( +1) / .u
The value of qu corresponds to a unique Nash equilibrium strategy
taken by each country at the stage game. From the assumption of an
interior solution and nb αb c+ − /2 < 0, we have b αb c+ − < 0.
Therefore, q0< <1u .
Diﬀerentiating π∑i
n
i=1 with respect to qi, the ﬁrst-order condition for
maximizing the total payoﬀ is
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟∑ π q bn αb cq∂ /∂ = + − =0.i
n
i i i=1 (4)
In Eq. (4), the optimal abatement level qc when all the countries
play cooperate is
q n α b c=( + ) / .c
The value of qc represents the unique Pareto-eﬃcient abatement
level. From the assumption of an interior solution and
nb αb c+ − /2 < 0, we have bn αb c+ − < 0. Therefore, q0< <1c .
Hence, the Pareto-eﬃcient abatement is n times the abatement
level in the Nash equilibrium. Substituting qc into (3), we have
π n α b c=( + ) /2 .c 2 2
3.2.2. Equilibrium outcome of Case II
We now examine the weakly renegotiation-proof condition. Lemma
3 gives the required conditions for the subgame perfection require-
ment, and Lemma 4 gives the required conditions for the renegotia-
tion-proofness requirement.
Lemma 3. The subgame perfection requirement holds if there exists
m such that
m n> ( −1)/2.
(Proof). See Appendix C. □
The right hand side of the above inequality is the lower bound of the
number of punishing countries and is only dependent on parameter n.
13 The expressions “subgame perfection” and “renegotiation-proofness” are used in
the study by Asheim et al. (2006).
14 In Froyn and Hovi (2008), the range of punishing countries is
c d d b n δd d b m c d b n b[ − − ( − )( − 1)]/[ − ( − )]≤ ≤ [ − ( − ) ]/ . Given that δ is close (but
not equal) to 1 and d b= , we have c b b m c b( − )/ < ≤ / .
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Lemma 4. The renegotiation-proofness requirement holds if there
exists m such that
m n≤( +1)/2.
(Proof). See Appendix D. □
The right hand side of the above inequality is the higher bound of
the number of punishing countries and is only dependent on parameter
n.
Proposition 2 is directly obtained from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Proposition 2. There exists a weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium
if the number of punishing countries (m) satisﬁes
n m n( −1)/2 < ≤( +1)/2.
Proposition 2 shows that the eﬀect of α disappears in Case II. In
other words, the ancillary beneﬁts do not aﬀect the agreement size
under the Penance-m strategy in Case II. Additionally, the number of
punishing countries only depends on the number of countries, n. The
value of m is close to n/2. For this payoﬀ function, ancillary beneﬁts
have no impact on the condition of a stable agreement.15 Therefore, the
result in Proposition 2 is a generalization of the analysis of Asheim and
Holtsmark (2009).16
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that full participation is still feasible even
when ancillary beneﬁts are considered in a repeated game framework. The
results of Finus and Rübbelke (2013) suggest that ancillary beneﬁts have a
neutral or negative impact on the formation of stable coalitions in a
participation game framework. That is, the positive eﬀect of Penance-m
on the participation of countries dominates the negative eﬀect of ancillary
beneﬁts on the formation of a stable coalition. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Penance-m speciﬁes that all countries participate, and
they play cooperate because of the existence of the punishing countries. In
other words, all countries cooperate for fear of the punishment levels.
That is, the sustainability of the agreement depends on the number of
punishing countries. Considering this punishment rather than other
elements such as ancillary beneﬁts, all countries choose the equilibrium
where all countries play cooperate through pre-play communication.17
Consequently, the ancillary beneﬁts do not aﬀect the agreement size under
the Penance-m strategy. However, the eﬀect on the numbers of punishing
countries using Cases I and II is diﬀerent. In the next section, we explain
why ancillary beneﬁts have an eﬀect in Case I but not Case II.
4. A comparison of the impact of ancillary beneﬁts on a
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium with respect to Case
I and Case II
This section reveals why the eﬀects of ancillary beneﬁts diﬀer
between the two types of payoﬀ functions: Case I, where the beneﬁt and
cost functions are linear, and Case II, where the beneﬁt function is
linear but the cost function is quadratic. We have the following results
from Section 3.
Result I: In Case I, the number of punishing countries reduces with
an increase in the ancillary beneﬁts.
Result II: In Case II, the ancillary beneﬁts have no impact on the
number of punishing countries. Therefore, the eﬀect of the ancillary
beneﬁts disappears.
Comparing the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts between the two cases
leads to Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. If an agreement where all n countries participate
and employ Penance-m is in a weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibrium, the ancillary beneﬁts decrease the number of punishing
countries with linear beneﬁt and cost functions, whereas the number
of punishing countries remains unchanged with linear beneﬁt and
quadratic cost functions.
Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 explain why the negative impact of
ancillary beneﬁts in Case I, obtained by Finus and Rübbelke (2013),
disappears when using the Penance–m strategy in a repeated game
framework, whereas, in Case II, the impact of ancillary beneﬁts
remains constant. To explain these results, we investigate the eﬀect
of ancillary beneﬁts on the subgame perfection and renegotiation-
proofness requirements considering three factors: (i) the gain from
deviating, (ii) the loss from punishment, and (iii) the gain from
renegotiation. (i) and (ii) consider that the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts
on the deviation incentive, and (iii) considers the eﬀect of ancillary
beneﬁts on the renegotiation incentive.
4.1. Case I
4.1.1. The impact of ancillary beneﬁts on the subgame perfection
requirement: Case I
We consider the impact of ancillary beneﬁts on the subgame
perfection requirement in Case I by investigating the signatories'
incentive for deviation.
From Eq. (2), the payoﬀ function of Case I is
∑π b q αbq cq i n= + − for =1,⋯, .i
j
n
j i i
=1
The abatement levels for the cooperate and defect cases are,
respectively,
q q=1and =0.c u
(i) The gain from deviating
A signatory’s payoﬀ is denoted by π n( )c and a deviator’s payoﬀ
is denoted by π n( − 1)n . Substituting these abatement levels into
the payoﬀ function results in
π n bn αb c( )= + − ,c (5a)
and
π n bn b( −1)= − .n (5b)
From Proposition 1, the subgame perfection requirement is
m c b α> / −1 − . Therefore, the lower bound of the number of punishing
countries decreases with an increase in α. The intuitive explanation
behind Eqs. (5a) and (5b) is that ancillary beneﬁts only increase the
payoﬀs to signatories, π n( )c , not the payoﬀs to deviators, π n( − 1)n . In
other words, the incremental beneﬁt of a deviation from Penance-m
c α b− (1 + ) suggests that the incentive for deviation is reduced by
ancillary beneﬁts. Consequently, a deviation can be prevented even if
the magnitude of punishment is weakened because there are less
punishing countries.
(ii) The loss from punishment
We compare the payoﬀs in the punishment phase (i.e., cooperating
or receiving a punishment). The payoﬀ when no country deviates is
denoted by π n( )c , and if one country deviates, the payoﬀ of a deviator in
the punishment phase is denoted by π n m( − )c . That is, n m− countries
(including the deviator play cooperate) and m punishing countries play
defect. Substituting these abatement levels into the payoﬀ function
results in
π n bn αb c( )= + − ,c (6a)
and
15 Finus and Rübbelke (2013) show a similar result in the case of linear beneﬁt and
quadratic cost functions.
16 For more details, see Asheim and Holtsmark (2009).
17 The rules of the repeated game implicitly permit pre-play communication. For more
details, see Barrett (2003).
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π n m b n m αb c( − )= ( − )+ − .c (6b)
From (6a) and (6b), the loss from punishment equals mb− .
Therefore, ancillary beneﬁts have no eﬀect on the loss of a deviator’s
payoﬀ in the punishment phase. From (i) and (ii), ancillary beneﬁts
reduce the incentive for deviation because the ancillary beneﬁts reduce
the gain from deviating.
4.1.2. The impact of ancillary beneﬁts on the renegotiation-proofness
requirement: Case I
The eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on the renegotiation-proofness
requirement in Case I is explained by investigating the punishing
countries' incentive for renegotiation.
(i) The gain of renegotiation
A punishing country’s payoﬀ of punishment, π n m( − )n , and the
payoﬀ of renegotiation, π n( )c , are denoted as
π n m bn bm( − )= − ,n (7a)
and
π n bn αb c( )= + − .c (7b)
The requirement for the renegotiation-proofness is m c b α≤ / −1 − .
This higher bound on the number of punishing countries decreases
with increasing α. Eqs. (7a) and (7b) state that the payoﬀ of punish-
ment, π n m( − )n , is not dependent on ancillary beneﬁts, but the payoﬀ
of renegotiation, π n( ),c is dependent on ancillary beneﬁts. In other
words, the incremental beneﬁt of punishing countries by renegotiation
b m α c( + ) − depends on the ancillary beneﬁts. To deter renegotiation,
the payoﬀ per punishing country must be increased by decreasing the
number of punishing countries. Therefore, an ancillary beneﬁt has a
positive impact on the payoﬀ when renegotiation is chosen.
4.2. Case II
From Proposition 2, the number of punishing countries is constant
even if there are ancillary beneﬁts. We analyze this result similarly to
Subsection 4.1.
4.2.1. The impact of ancillary beneﬁts on the subgame perfection
requirement: Case II
This subsubsection reveals the eﬀect of ancillary beneﬁts on the
subgame perfection requirement in Case II in a manner similar to
Subsubsection 4.1.1.
From Eq. (3), the payoﬀ function of Case II is
∑π b q αbq cq i n= + − /2 for =1,⋯, ,i j
n
j i i=1
2
In Case II, the abatement levels for the cooperate and defect cases
are deﬁned as, respectively:
q n α b c q α b c=( + ) / and =( + 1) / .c u
(i) The gain from deviating
The signatory’s payoﬀ is denoted by π n( )c , and the deviator’s
payoﬀ is denoted by π n( − 1)n . Substituting these abatement levels
into the payoﬀ function gives
π n n αn α b c( )=( +2 + ) /2 ,c 2 2 2 (8a)
and
π n n n αn α b c( −1)=(2 −2 +1 + 2 + ) /2 .n 2 2 2 (8b)
From Proposition 2, the requirement for subgame perfection is
m n>( + 1)/2, which is unaﬀected by ancillary beneﬁts. The intuitive
explanation behind Eq. (8a) and (8b) is that the ancillary beneﬁts
increase the payoﬀs to signatories, π n( )c , by the same amount as the
payoﬀs to deviators, π n( − 1)n .18 The incremental beneﬁt of deviation
from Penance-m is not dependent on the ancillary beneﬁts; it is equal
to b n c( − 1) /22 2 . That is, an ancillary beneﬁt has no impact on a
deviator’s payoﬀ. Therefore, the incentive for deviation remains con-
stant irrespective of the ancillary beneﬁts.
(ii) The loss from punishment
The payoﬀ when no country deviates is denoted by π n( )c , and if one
country deviates, the payoﬀ of a deviator in the punishment phase is
π n m( − )c . Substituting these abatement levels into the payoﬀ function
results in
π n n αn α b c( )=( +2 + ) /2 ,c 2 2 2 (9a)
and
π n m n αn α m mn b c( − )=( +2 + +2 −2 ) /2 .c 2 2 2 (9b)
From the above equations, the loss from punishment is
b m n c− ( − 1)/2 . Therefore, ancillary beneﬁts have no eﬀect on the loss
of the deviator’s payoﬀ in the punishment phase. From (i) and (ii),
ancillary beneﬁts have no eﬀect on the deviation incentive.
4.2.2. The impact of ancillary beneﬁts on the renegotiation-proofness
requirement: Case II
We investigate the eﬀect of the ancillary beneﬁts on the renegotia-
tion-proofness requirement in Case II in a similar way to
Subsubsection 4.1.2.
(xxix) The gain of renegotiation
A punishing country’s punishment payoﬀ, π n m( − )n , and the payoﬀ
of renegotiation, π n( )c , are
π n m n mn m αn α b c( − )=(2 −2 −1 + 2 +2 + ) /2 ,n 2 2 2 (10a)
and
π n n αn α b c( )=( +2 + ) /2 .c 2 2 2 (10b)
The renegotiation-proofness requirement, m n≤ ( + 1)/2, is unaf-
fected by ancillary beneﬁts. Equations (10a) and (10b) state that the
ancillary beneﬁts increase the punishing country’s payoﬀs, π n m( − )n ,
by the same amount as the renegotiation payoﬀs, π n( ).c Therefore, the
incremental beneﬁt of punishing countries by renegotiation is
n n m b c−( − 1)( + 1 − 2 ) /22 . In other words, an ancillary beneﬁt has
no impact on the payoﬀ increases when punishment is chosen.
From Subsubsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we see that ancillary beneﬁts
have no role on the weakly renegotiation-proofness requirement in the
case of linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost functions. Because the
ancillary beneﬁts have no role, the results of Asheim and Holtsmark
(2009) remain unchanged.
5. Summary and discussion
This paper presents new theoretical ﬁndings on the eﬀect of ancillary
beneﬁts on IEAs with full participation. We investigate the eﬀect of ancillary
beneﬁts in a repeated game framework, applying Penance-m to two types of
payoﬀ functions: Case I with linear beneﬁt and cost functions, and Case II
with linear beneﬁt and quadratic cost functions.
This study draws the following conclusions. First, the results of our
study generalize the ﬁndings of Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) and
Froyn and Hovi (2008). That is, full participation is feasible in Cases I
and II, even when ancillary beneﬁts are taken into consideration.
Second, our research demonstrates how the diﬀerent results compare
to the results of Finus and Rübbelke (2013) and Froyn and Hovi
(2008), which consider a diﬀerent situation. Finus and Rübbelke
18 Finus and Rübbelke (2013, p. 218) show a similar result.
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(2013) show that ancillary beneﬁts have a negative or neutral impact
on a stable coalition in a participation game model. Compared to Finus
and Rübbelke (2013), our situation is diﬀerent because we do not
assume compliance. If the ancillary beneﬁts are newly taken into
consideration using our framework, the negative eﬀect disappears.
Froyn and Hovi (2008) show that a full participation agreement can be
sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium under Penance-
m. Compared to Froyn and Hovi (2008), our situation is diﬀerent
because we introduce ancillary beneﬁts. If the ancillary beneﬁts are
considered in our framework, the number of punishing countries can
decrease because of the ancillary beneﬁts while achieving a full
participation agreement. Third, this study reveals that, although full
participation is achieved for two types of payoﬀ functions, the eﬀect of
ancillary beneﬁts diﬀers between the two cases. The number of
punishing countries decreases with an increase in ancillary beneﬁts
in Case I and remains unchanged in Case II. In other words, the
ancillary beneﬁts aﬀect the incentive for deviation and renegotiation in
Case I, whereas the ancillary beneﬁts have no impact on these
incentives in Case II.
The directions for future research are promising. First, we should
explore the impact of international trade on full participation IEAs. For
instance, Cai et al. (2013) reveal that international trade enhances the
incentive for participation in agreements. Therefore, it is important to
consider a cooperative coalition formation in the event that one
country’s provision of public goods encourages abatement in another
country. Second, we should study IEAs with domestic environmental
policies and the concept of environmental R &D. Finally, we should
also analyze the full participation agreement for heterogeneous coun-
tries.19
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
We examine the subgame perfection of Penance-m for the following three cases.
(a) Consider the incentive constraint that n m− countries adopt Penance-m after a unilateral deviation becomes a unique binding constraint.
Therefore, this study veriﬁes the payoﬀ of n m− countries after a deviation. If these countries play cooperate in periods t and t+1, the country
receives b n m αb c δ bn αb c( − )+ − + ( + − ). If the country deviates in period t and returns to Penance-m in the next period, it receives
b n m δ b n m αb c( − − 1)+ [ ( − )+ − ]. Thereafter, each country receives n αb c+ − from period t + 2 onwards. Therefore, we compare the payoﬀs
in periods t and t + 1. Consequently, it is individually rational for n m− countries to adopt Penance-m in period t if
b n m αb c δ bn αb c b n m δ b n m αb c( − )+ − + ( + − )≥ ( − −1)+ [ ( − )+ − ].
Solving the above inequality for m, we obtain
m c b αb δb≥( − − )/ .
If δ is close (but not equal) to 1, we obtain
m c b α> / − 1 − . (A.1)
(b) Consider the incentive constraint that each country plays cooperate when there is no deviation at any period. A participating country i receives
bn αb c+ − in each period if no deviation has occurred in the previous period. If country i deviates in period t and returns to Penance-m in
period t + 1, it receives b n( − 1) in period t and b n m αb c( − )+ − in period t + 1. Thereafter, each country receives n αb c+ − from period t + 2
onwards. It is individually rational for each country to stick to Penance-m in periods t andt + 1 if
δ n αb c b n δ b n m αb c(1 + )( + − )≥ ( −1)+ [ ( − )+ − ].
If δ is close (but not equal) to 1 in the above inequality, we obtain
m c b α> / − 1 − . (A.2)
(c) Consider the incentive constraint that m countries punish a deviation. First, we consider the payoﬀ of a punishing country when it fails to
punish, that is, when it plays cooperate in period t after a deviation in period t − 1. In this case, the payoﬀ is b n m αb c( − + 1)+ − . The country
defecting in period t will be punished in period t + 1, so this defection leads to a loss in period t − 1. Hence, it suﬃces to check that the m
punishing countries that are prescribed by Penance-m to play defect as punishment in period t have no incentive to play cooperate. Because
b αb c+ − < 0 always holds,
b n m b n m αb c( − ) > ( − +1)+ − .
Therefore, the incentive constraints correspond to (A.1) and (A.2). The right hand side of inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) is the lower bound of the
number of punishing countries.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the constraint for an agreement to be renegotiation-proof. The payoﬀ of m punishing countries when punishment is applied should be
greater than or equal to those with renegotiation.
Subsequently, assume that one country deviates in period t−1. The payoﬀ of the punishing countries is b n m( − ) if they adopt Penance-m in
period t and they receive bn αb c+ − if they play cooperate by renegotiation. The countries receive the same payoﬀ regardless of their action from
period t+1 onward. Therefore, we consider the payoﬀ in period t . Thus, renegotiation-proof requires that
19 The heterogeneity of countries has been considered in several ﬁelds. For example, McGinty (2007) considers the asymmetric case of a country’s beneﬁt function in the participation
game model in the ﬁeld of pollution abatement in IEAs. Zhuang et al. (2007) and Zhuang (2010) consider the heterogeneity of countries in the ﬁeld of investment in homeland security.
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bn αb c b n m+ − ≤ ( − ),
or
m c b α≤ / − . (A.3)
The right-hand side of Eq. (A.3) is the upper bound of the punishing countries.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 3
We examine the subgame perfection as follows.
(a) Consider the incentive constraints that n m− countries adopt Penance-m after a unilateral deviation. Let us examine the behaviors of country i in
period t when one country deviates from Penance-m in period t−1. Deviation in this case means that they choose the abatement level qu.
If a country in n m− plays cooperate in period t and returns to full participation, the payoﬀ is b n m q mq αbq cq δπ[( − ) + ]+ − /2+c u c c c2 .
If a country in n m− countries deviates in period t and plays cooperate in period t+1, the payoﬀ is
b n m q m q αbq cq δ b n m q mq αbq cq[( − − 1) +( + 1) ]+ − /2+ [ [( − ) + ]+ − /2]c u u u c u c c2 2 . Thereafter, each country receives πc from period t + 2 onwards.
Therefore, we compare the payoﬀs in periods t and t + 1.
Now, each country plays Penance-m in all periods if
b n m q mq αbq cq δπ b n m q m q αbq cq δ b n m q mq αbq cq[( − ) + ]+ − /2+ ≥ [( − −1) +( +1) ]+ − /2+ [ [( − ) + ]+ − /2].c u c c c c u u u c u c c2 2 2
Assuming that δ is close (but not equal) to 1,
m n> ( − 1)/2. (A.4)
(b) Consider the incentive constraint that each country plays cooperate when there is no deviation in any period. A participating country i receives
π δπ+c c in each period if no deviation has occurred in the previous period. If country i deviates in period t and return to Penance-m in period
t + 1, it receives b n q q αbq cq[( − 1) + ]+ − /2c u u u2 in period t and b n m q mq αbq cq[( − ) + ]+ − /2c u c c2 in period t + 1. Thereafter, each country receives πc
from period t + 2 onwards. It is individually rational for each country to stick to Penance-m in periods t and t + 1 if
δ π b n q q αbq cq δ b n m q mq αbq cq(1 + ) ≥ [( −1) + ]+ − /2+ [ [( − ) + ]+ − /2].c c u u u c u c c2 2
Assuming that δ is close (but not equal) to 1, we have
m n> ( − 1)/2. (A.5)
(c) Consider the incentive constraint that m punishing countries punish a deviation. First, consider the payoﬀ of a punishing country when it fails to
punish, that is, when it plays cooperate in period t after a deviation in period t − 1. In this case, the payoﬀ is
b n m q m q αbq cq[( − + 1) +( − 1) ]+ − /2c u c c2 . The country defecting in period t will be punished in period t + 1, so this defection leads to a loss
in period t − 1. Hence, it suﬃces to check that the m punishing countries that play defect as punishment in period t have no incentive to deviate
from Penance-m by playing cooperate. Because n > 1 always holds,
b n m q mq αbq cq b n m q m q αbq cq[( − ) + ]+ − /2 > [( − +1) +( −1) ]+ − /2.c u u u c u c c2 2
Therefore, the incentive constraint is derived from (A.4) and (A.5). The right hand side of these inequalities is the lower bound of the number of
punishing countries.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 4
To consider the conditions that ensure an agreement adopting Penance-m is renegotiation-proof, we examine the payoﬀ to the punishing
countries. After a unilateral deviation, the punishing countries behave in two ways: (i) if they punish in period t , the payoﬀ is
b n m q mq αbq cq[( − ) + ]+ − /2c u u u2 ; (ii) if they return to the Penance-m strategy and play cooperate, the payoﬀ is πc. Penance-m is renegotiation-
proof if the former is greater than or equal to the latter. The punishing countries receive the same payoﬀ regardless of their action from period t+1
onward. Therefore, we compare the payoﬀs in period t . Solving this inequality for m, we obtain
b n m q mq αbq cq π[( − ) + ]+ − /2≥ ,c u u u c2
or
m n≤( +1)/2.
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